Bright Line Rules v. Facts And Circumstances: Further Thoughts On In Re: Cassandra C.

What was the real legal dispute in In re: Cassandra C.?  Yes, the specific question was whether a 17-year-old teenager could be forced against her will to undergo life-saving chemotherapy.  But, what was the real issue? 

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Supreme Court Affirms Cassandra C. Is Not A “Mature Minor”

Only minutes after hearing oral arguments in the appeal of In re: Cassandra C. (see my earlier posts), the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled from the bench, unanimously, that the 17-year-old teen who wanted the legal right to refuse life-saving chemotherapy was not a “mature minor” and, therefore, could not refuse such treatment. 

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In Re: Cassandra C., Ctd.

Two quick updates to the preceding post concerning the appeal in In re: Cassandra C.  First, Cassandra’s attorneys filed their reply brief today.  The filing of that brief, which responds to the legal arguments the Department of Children and Families made in its brief, concludes the written briefs portion of the appeal.  Second, the oral argument in the Supreme Court at 12:00 p.m. on Thursday, January 8 will be televised (I assume by CT-N).

I plan to attend the oral argument on Thursday and hope to have a post-argument post later that day.  Stay tuned.


Can A Minor Refuse Lifesaving Medical Treatment? A Discussion Of In Re: Cassandra C.

Governor Malloy recently reappointed former state Supreme Court Justice Joette Katz as Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”), reflecting his faith in her ability to run the critically important, but much maligned, agency. And, by accepting that reappointment, Katz revealed that she is either a saint or a glutton for punishment.

The punishment may continue (undeservedly so in my humble opinion) as the public learns more about a case that the Connecticut Supreme Court will hear, on an expedited/emergency basis, this Thursday, January 8.  The case, In re Cassandra C., involves a now 17-year-old girl who was diagnosed last September with cancer, specifically, high-risk Hodgkin’s lymphoma. (Several media entities reported on the case over the past few days. However, the existence of the expedited appeal has been reflected on the Supreme Court’s electronic docket since mid-December.)

As Cassandra’s attorneys acknowledge in their appellate brief, “[t]he uncontroverted testimony of several medical professionals indicated that Cassandra’s disease, if treated with chemotherapy, presented an 85% chance of survival, but if left untreated, presented a near certainty of death within two years.” See Joint Brief of Respondent Mother and Minor Child (“Joint Br.”) at 2 (emphasis supplied). The problem is Cassandra apparently doesn’t want the chemotherapy that will almost certainly cure her. She apparently prefers virtually certain death. And Cassandra’s mother won’t consent on her behalf. Neither Cassandra’s nor her mother’s objections to the treatment are religiously-based.  See Brief of Petitioner-Appellee (“DCF Br.”) at 18. They just don’t want the life-saving treatment.

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Appellate Court To Hear Jane Doe Case

The Connecticut Appellate Court will hear oral arguments this Thursday morning in the case of In re: Angel R., otherwise known as the Jane Doe case.  Jane is a transgender youth in the custody of the Department of Children and Families, whose temporary transfer to the York Correctional Institution For Women in Niantic earlier this year provoked strong reactions from many individuals and civil rights groups.  The appeal focuses on the constitutionality of a rarely invoked statute that authorizes a Superior Court judge, under certain circumstances, to transfer a youth in DCF custody to a correctional facility.  Two of the briefs in the case are available at this link.


The Practice Book And Section 1-2z–Not!

This post is another in a series of Dan Klau mini-tirades against the judicial application of General Statutes § 1-2z–the statutory “plain meaning rule”–to legal texts that are not statutes.  As I have said before, and now say once again, the plain language of § 1-2z makes clear that it only applies to statutes.  Thus, it does not apply to administrative regulations, local ordinances or, in my opinion, the Practice Book.  Yet the state Supreme Court appears to disagree.

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Justice McDonald And The Fourth Amendment

It is still early in Justice Andrew McDonald’s judicial career, but does anyone else see the makings of a justice who is not afraid to say “no” to the state in Fourth Amendment cases?

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Should The Chief Justice Always Decide Who Writes An Opinion?

A colleague recently lent me his copy of the new biography of Justice Scalia, “A Court of One.”  It’s an enjoyable read. Last night I was reading a chapter that discussed how opinions are assigned to particular justices for drafting after oral argument. The power to assign an opinion to a particular justice is quite significant. Even when the opinion of the court is unanimous, the assignment of drafting responsibility to a particular justice can have a great impact on the scope of the ultimate decision. Some justices are known for narrow decisions, others write much more broadly. Each justice speaks with a unique “voice.”  Moreover, the non-writing justices tend to be fairly deferential to the authoring justice in any given case because the non-writing justices want similar deference when they are drafting opinions for the court.

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Supreme Court To Reconsider State v. Kitchens

On October 1, 2014, the Connecticut Supreme Court issued the following order on the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal the Appellate Court’s decision in State v. Herring:

On consideration of the petition by the defendant for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court . . . it is hereby ordered that said petition be, and the same is hereby granted, limited to the following issue: “Should this court overrule State v. Kitchens, thereby permitting review of the defendant’s unpreserved claim of instructional impropriety?  If so, is the defendant entitled to prevail on that claim under Golding?

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The U.S. Supreme Court’s Surprising Show Of Restraint

Today the United States Supreme Court surprised just about everyone by declining to hear appeals in any of seven cases in which lower courts had struck down as unconstitutional state laws banning same-sex marriage.  Legal bloggers are having a field day as they try to understand why the four solidly conservative justices on the court (Roberts, Scalia, Alito and Thomas) did not vote in favor of granting at least one of the petitions for a writ of certiorari.  (Only four votes are required to grant a cert petition.)

I am ill-equipped to weigh in on this issue.  But here are three links (click herehere and here) to a few different perspectives on the issue.  A more extensive discussion of the Court’s surprising decision appears on SCOTUSblog.