This Sunday (April 19), on WFSB’s Face the State, Dennis House will present an “exclusive, rare look inside a place few people in Connecticut have been: the State Supreme Court.” Although politics and specific cases are off limits, House’s interview of Chief Justice Chase Rogers and justices Richard Palmer, Dennis Eveleigh, Richard Robinson and Andrew McDonald should be enlightening to viewers unfamiliar with the way the state’s high court works.
Hat tip: Proloy Das
With the Hartford Courant calling on the General Assembly to sanction Hartford Representative Minnie Gonzalez for an email she wrote the other day, I was curious about what the Connecticut Constitution says about the authority of the House or Senate to punish its own members. Article III, section 13, entitled “Powers of each house”, states:
Each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings, and punish members for disorderly conduct, and, with the consent of two-thirds, expel a member, but not a second time for the same cause; and shall have all other powers necessary for a branch of the legislature of a free and independent state.
On January 8, 2015, the Supreme Court heard expedited oral arguments in In re: Cassandra C, the case involving a 17-year-old adolescent who claimed the right to refuse life-saving chemotherapy for her Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Only minutes after the oral argument concluded, the court issued a brief oral ruling from the bench in which the justices unanimously rejected Cassandra C.’s argument that the court should adopt the so-called “mature minor” doctrine. The court said that a formal written opinion would follow. Today, the court issued its written opinion.
Last Friday the State filed a motion asking the Connecticut Supreme Court to reconsider, en banc, its 4-2 decision in Lapointe v. Comm’r of Correction, which generated four opinions: the majority opinion (Palmer, J.), a concurring opinion (Rogers, C.J.) and two dissents (Espinosa, J. and Zarella, J.). The case has generated considerable controversy for several reasons, including the unjudicial tone of some of the opinions and footnotes and, perhaps more importantly, the majority’s resolution of the case based on an issue that was neither briefed nor argued.
Kudos to Representative Ed Jutila (D-East Lyme) and eight other members of the Government Administration and Elections (GAE) committee for voting to send Raised Bill 6750 to the floor of the House for consideration. (Read CT News Junkie’s story about the vote.)
I’ve written about the importance of Raised Bill 6750 in a previous post; it would overrule a bad Connecticut Supreme Court decision that substantially curtailed public access to arrest-related records. The proposed bill would restore the Freedom of Information Commission’s longstanding interpretation of state law, which allowed greater access to such records, subject to important exemptions, including protecting the identity of witnesses and avoiding disclosures that would prejudice a prospective law enforcement action. The bill strikes the proper balance between the public’s right to know and law enforcement’s need to avoid premature disclosure of certain information in order to protect the integrity of investigations and potential prosecutions..
Last week Indiana enacted a controversial law that many believe is intended to allow individuals, particularly for-profit business owners, to discriminate against persons who identify as LGBT, on the ground that providing services to such persons may burden the provider’s religious convictions. Today, Governor Dannel P. Malloy announced that he will sign an executive order banning state-funded travel to Indiana. The governor stated, “When new laws turn back the clock on progress, we can’t sit idly by. We are sending a message that discrimination won’t be tolerated.”
In response to the governor’s announcement, some are arguing that Connecticut is being hypocritical because it has its own law, enacted in 1993, that is (allegedly) no different from, or is even worse than, the new Indiana law. (Click here and here for examples of such arguments.)
Are those arguments correct? I think not. Nothing in the text or history of the Connecticut law suggests that the General Assembly intended to allow individuals or business owners to discriminate against members of the LGBT community based on religious beliefs.
Under Jewish law, a “Get” is a document that a husband must give his wife to effect a divorce. Without a Get, a woman who has obtained a civil divorce is still considered married under Jewish law and may not remarry.
The biblical requirement (Deuteronomy 24:1) that the husband give his wife a Get in order to formally end their marriage under Jewish law means that a recalcitrant husband can use the Get as leverage in a civil divorce. Or he can simply be cruel and refuse to give the Get out of spite. And in Israel, where there is no distinction between civil and religious marriage, and in very orthodox communities outside of Israel, a husband who won’t give his wife a Get effectively enslaves her to him.
News about former Bridgeport Mayor Joseph Ganim’s interest in running for public office once again prompted me to take a look at the law in Connecticut concerning the rights of felons to vote and run for public office. Those rights are set forth in Chapter 143 of the General Statutes.
A person convicted of a felony forfeits his right to become an elector, i.e. his right to vote, AND “may not be a candidate for or hold public office.” See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-46. However, the law allows for the restoration of electoral privileges, including the right to run for and hold public office, “upon the payment of all fines in conjunction with the conviction and once such person has been discharged from confinement, and, if applicable, parole.” Id., § 9-46a.
Mr. Ganim was released from prison in 2010. Does anyone know whether he has satisfied the requirements for restoration of his electoral privileges and, if so, have his electoral privileges been formally restored?
My fixation on King v. Burwell continues unabated. Recall that the issue in this statutory construction case is whether the text of the Affordable Care Act only permits the federal government to subsidize qualified individuals (by income) who purchase insurance on state-operated exchanges, or whether subsidies are also available to all qualified individuals, regardless of whether they purchase insurance through a state-operated exchange or the federal exchange, www.healthcare.gov.
The question on my mind today concerns the efficacy of a strategy that the defenders, the Solicitor General in particular, appear to have adopted in their appellate briefs: leading with a relatively weaker argument followed by a relatively stronger backup argument.
So much ink has been spilled in anticipation of, and in the 48 hours since, the oral argument in King v. Burwell that I have not felt I had anything meaningful to contribute. For readers who are not very familiar with King v. Burwell, it is the U.S. Supreme Court case about whether the Affordable Care Act only authorizes subsidies for individuals who purchase insurance on state-operated insurance exchanges, or whether subsidies are also available to citizens of states that did not create their own exchange and, therefore, who purchase insurance through the federal exchange. The plaintiffs in King v. Burwell argue the text of the ACA clearly and unambiguously supports the former position, while the ACA’s defenders, including the Obama administration, argue that the text of the act clearly and unambiguously supports the latter position.