I do not practice employment law, but I know a good employment law case when I see one. Longtime Connecticut employment attorney Lori Rittman Clark, who is now practicing in Massachusetts, writes about Snay v. Gulliver Prepatory School, a case out of Florida involving the intersection of Facebook, settlement agreement confidentiality and claw back provisions. In an excerpt from her blog, Clark writes:
Yesterday, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (the top court in the Commonwealth) decided a case involving a criminal prosecution against a man who used his cellphone camera to take pictures looking up women’s skirts–so-called “upskirting.” The SJC held that the state’s “Peeping Tom” law did not apply to the defendant’s conduct. Read the rest of this entry »
The Litigation Section of the Connecticut Bar Association has invited former state Supreme Court Justice Ian McLachlan and noted appellate advocate Linda Morkan to discuss the Connecticut Supreme Court’s recent decision in Blumberg Associates Worldwide v. Brown and Brown. As I’ve discussed in prior posts, the decision addresses the circumstances under which appellate courts can resolve appeals based on unpreserved issues that the appellate judges raise sua sponte.
The McLachlan/Morkan presentation will take place at the Litigation Section’s meeting on March 4, 2014, from 6:00 pm to 9:00 pm, at Carmen Anthony’s Steakhouse in New Haven. It should be a great meeting. Click here to register!
Equal outcomes or equal opportunity? I hear this question debated constantly. But like debates about the meaning and existence of God, I find debates about equal opportunity v. outcomes pointless unless we first define the meaning of the terms being debated.
Does anyone out there suffer from the same problem I do, to wit, a compulsion to watch House of Cards, followed by a feeling of revulsion after watching each episode? But let’s leave the psychoanalysis for another day . . . .
“The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.”
Supreme Court Justice Louis B. Brandies (dissenting in Olmstead v. United States (1928))
The law affords a person the right to hire an attorney to represent him in a civil or criminal proceeding or to represent himself, that is, to appear pro se. But does a person have a right to have a lawyer appear on his behalf in a case AND to enter a pro se appearance as well? Is there a right to “hybrid” representation?
Connecticut is known as the “Constitution State,” not just because that’s what appears on many license plates, but because of a very old document known as the “Fundamental Orders,” which some argue represents the first written constitution in America.
Not everyone agrees with the accuracy of that historical argument. Attorney Michael Besso, former law clerk to Chief Justice Ellen Ash Peters, Assistant Attorney General, and member of the board of directors (and Editor-in-Chief) of the Connecticut Supreme Court Historical Society, has researched the history of the Fundamental Orders in depth. I invited him to share his thoughts as a guest blogger.
A few months ago I wrote a post about a case I had argued in the state Supreme Court in March of last year. The main issue in the case was whether, absent plain error, constitutional error or an issue implicating subject matter jurisdiction, appellate courts can raise on their own initiative (i.e., sua sponte) an issue that neither party had raised below or on appeal, and then decide the case based on that issue. I jokingly characterized the dispute as requiring the Supreme Court to decide whether appellate jurists are mere umpires who decide the issues the parties raise–and only those issues–or whether they are gods who are able to dream up unpreserved issues out of thin air in the interest of doing justice.
Today, the Supreme Court provided the answer to that question: appellate jurists are gods.
After a year of emotion clouding reason in the public debate over freedom of information in Connecticut, a ray of sanity broke through those clouds last Thursday.
Efforts to curtail public access to 911 calls and photographs of homicides have gained momentum since last June, culminating in a widely criticized set of recommendations proposed last month by the legislature’s ”Task Force on Victim Privacy and the Public’s Right to Know.” The Task Force, which was weighted in favor of privacy advocates, and which never even considered the possibility of recommending that the legislature repeal anti-Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) legislation it passed in almost total secrecy last June, recommended that 911 emergency calls and other records be made largely exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.